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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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MC 37

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: Feb. 7, 1962

SUBJECT: Five Power Meeting of Experts on Disarmament:
Third meeting.

(4) PARTICIPANTS: See attachment.

(60) COPIES TO: ACDA - 50 (Per distribution USDEL 18-NDC/ADM 1)
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Mr. Beam opened the meeting by announcing that the US and UK had now delivered a message to Mr. Khrushchev regarding the forthcoming disarmament negotiations. He stated that the text of the message to Chairman Khrushchev would not be made public for the time being. He indicated the letter states that the President and Prime Minister believe a supreme effort must be made at the new disarmament negotiations. Disarmament negotiations have been too sporadic and frequently interrupted in the past. The letter proposes that the President, the Prime Minister and Chairman Khrushchev accept personal responsibility for directing the participation of their disarmament representatives. The letter proposes in addition that agreement be reached beforehand that the representatives of the three powers will remain in Geneva as long as necessary to achieve concrete results.

The letter proposes the negotiators seek progress on three levels: (1) a program of general and complete disarmament to serve as a basis for negotiating a treaty or treaties; (2) an attempt to ascertain the widest measure of agreement which can be implemented at the earliest possible time; (3) an effort to identify initial disarmament measures which, if put into effect without delay, would improve security and enhance prospects for disarmament progress.

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DECLASSIFIED BY/RELEASE AUTHORITY:
KATHY ALLEGRONE, SENIOR REVIEWER
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL
DATE: JANUARY 8, 2020

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The letter proposes that, as a symbol of the importance of the negotiations, the powers be represented at the outset of the Conference by their Foreign Ministers who would return as progress warranted. The letter indicates other Foreign Ministers may also wish to attend.

Mr. Beam indicated that Foreign Ministries in Rome, Paris and Ottawa had been advised by the appropriate United States and UK Ambassador. He stressed the secret nature of this initiative. He urged the utmost discretion regarding this approach before the announcement is released. He indicated we would have no objection if the various foreign offices approached, subsequent to the announcement, indicated they had received prior notification. Mr. Beam said the letter had been delivered to Gromyko this morning addressed to Khrushchev.

Mr. Beam then proceeded with the general review of papers. The first paper considered was BPP 3 on the positions of the eight new states.

General Riddel felt it was a useful history and that it should remain as a conference document to be supplemented by the various allies on a continuing basis as the allies, through their contacts with the various new members, develop information on the positions of those states.

Mr. Wilkinson pointed out with regard to the Brazilian position on the "Ban the Bomb" Resolution that Brazil had taken a somewhat different position than the other eight and that perhaps this should be noted on page 17 in the second paragraph. Mr. Spiers indicated that the paper was based in large part on the views of the eight as expressed at the 16th General Assembly. He believed that in past assemblies the Brazilians in particular had been more cautious on resolutions such as Ban the Bomb.

Mr. Wilkinson pointed out that he thought the paragraph on the Swedish view on control might be somewhat optimistic. Ambassador Dean said that from his conversations with Baron Unden, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Unden was inclined to be skeptical about Western requirements for control. Unden believed in exploring more informal methods -- the use of scientific interchange for example. The general feeling he got from Unden was that the essence is to get an agreement. Unden believed the West should have given in more on various control measures in the test ban.

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Regarding the last paragraph on page 17, Mr. Wilkinson said that while the eight had criticized certain US positions hadn't they also criticized the Soviets? Mr. Spiers pointed out that all eight had supported our UN resolution on testing. At the same time, the eight had believed a moratorium on testing desirable while control was a secondary question to them.

Mr. Wilkinson said it was of course unlikely that the US position will be defended by any of the eight neutrals, but at the same time it is unlikely that the Soviet position will be either. He believed the general tone of this paper was somewhat more pessimistic regarding the neutrals than we had a right to expect. Whatever the neutrals might have said at the United Nations under the full glare of publicity, in the 18-nation Conference we could expect things to be different. Ambassador Dean asked Mr. Wilkinson if he could be more explicit about this point of view. Wilkinson replied that the UK believed the atmosphere at the 16th General Assembly had made the neutrals much more critical of our position. He believed in the future they would be less robust regarding the Soviet position particularly if the meetings at Geneva were not held publicly. Mr. Beam said he hoped we were in for a pleasant surprise regarding the assessment contained in the paper. Mr. Popper pointed out that we had no experience with how neutral states might act in a disarmament conference. When screened from publicity, the positions taken by them might end up somewhere about 50 per cent of the way between what they would do in a completely closed conference and what they would say in the UN.

General Burns supported the United Kingdom assessment of the paper. Not taking votes at Geneva would be a help. It certainly would make it easier for the neutrals to avoid taking a stand. Mr. Popper pointed out that after the first flurry of publicity in the opening weeks of the conference we could expect a general calming of the atmosphere and that the neutrals as a result would be more content to remain in the background, taking the middle way on many of the issues. Mr. Wilkinson pointed out UK general feeling that it was a good paper and re-emphasized the need that it be kept up to date.

Mr. Beam asked if any of the allies had heard of the intent of any of the eight to submit their own plans. General Burns replied that they had been in touch with Delhi and that the Indians were still studying the situation.

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It was not inconceivable that Khrishna Menon would work up a plan. Ambassador Dean asked if Arthur Lall would lead the Indian delegation. General Burns replied that he believed so, but that Khrishna Menon would probably be there at the start.

Mr. Beam asked if the allies had any indications regarding other heads of delegations. We have heard that the Burmese delegation would be headed by U Pe Kin, Burma's Ambassador at Cairo, and the UAR delegation would be headed by Abdel Fattah Hassan their Permanent Representative at Geneva. Ambassador Dean pointed out that Gilberto Amado would head the Brazilian delegation. He presently represents Brazil in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, has attended both Law of the Sea conferences and is a member of the International Law Commission.

Mr. Dainelli pointed out that the Italian ambassadors in the capitals of the eight new members had been asked to canvass views on disarmament. While few replies had been received, three general results were apparent: (1) the neutrals were technically unprepared now and they would probably be in the same position later on; (2) we must be under no illusions about "counting on" certain countries. There would be a "rainbow of neutralities," but all independent of either side. Even those closest to us like Brazil would not stand with the West on a proposal not favored, for example, by the Africans. While in such a case they might not stand against us they would certainly dodge the issues; (3) External political factors would have a great deal of influence on neutral positions at the conference. Dainelli pointed out that Italy had good relations with some of the neutrals. For example, in the UAR their Ambassador had talked with Nasser about this subject. The Italians were however under no illusions regarding their influence in the UAR and their Ambassador had been led to believe that Nasser has talked with Tito at some length about disarmament. Dainelli urged each of the allies bilaterally and confidentially to keep each other informed on matters regarding political problems lying outside the narrow field of disarmament, but which might have a direct bearing on the positions of the new members at the Conference. The allies should use all their influence to stop, avert or neutralize whatever the eight might do to make difficult allied disarmament positions. Coordination was essential and Italy would help.

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In this connection, Mr. Beam pointed out that we had circularized our missions in the capitals of the eight and in some cases found them uninformed on the technical issues. We were now sending an officer to visit the capitals of the eight. His ostensible purpose was to brief our missions in the area. He would also be available for discreet talks with Foreign Ministry officials. His purpose was to support Western ideas on disarmament in a very low-key way. He will give the allies a report on his return.

Turning to the next paper DMP 2/1 on Outer Space, Mr. Beam asked Mr. Gathright to point up any particular features of the paper to which the allies attention should be drawn. Mr. Gathright said our general policy was to avoid a debate regarding certain military activities in space. However, we desired to prevent the placing in orbit weapons of mass destruction, and it would be difficult to avoid debate regarding other activities in space. We were preparing guidance on these subjects.

General Riddel pointed out we should try to avoid defining "Outer Space." Mr. Gathright agreed this would be desirable but pointed out that we assumed our space vehicles orbit in "outer space."

General Burns commented that the Soviet proposal, while similar to our, is of course designed to cover all vehicles with a military purpose. There will be much controversy on this matter. It might be good tactics for us to suggest at some time that our observation satellites could operate under the aegis of the I.D.O. Mr. Gathright pointed out that we would be prepared to state that such capabilities should serve disarmament objectives, while leaving vague the exact means of doing this. We would not be prepared to make a specific commitment on means. In this regard he noted the Swedes in a speech at the UN had said that the availability of observation satellites might alter the views of "others" regarding inspection. On the other hand, the Indians recently had sought to ban military space activities while at the same time keeping open the freedom of space for exploration. These two views might be expected to arise at some point in the 18-nation Conference.

General Burns asked whether we intended to include the point about observation satellites and their relationship to inspection activities in this paper. Mr. Gathright pointed out that we had in preparation a related paper, an annex, which would contain these ideas.

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Colonel Florio said he was not much worried about the Soviet phrasing "special devices" in their plan. This term has broad application, both civilian and military. He implied that in the course of defining these terms the Soviets would be forced to distinguish between the various types of satellites. Turning to pre-launch inspection, he said he believed they might well be an impediment to the successful conduct of launchings. In addition, in the launching sequence itself there was ample time for a determined violator to undo the work of the inspectors. Mr. Gathright pointed out that we felt the concept of pre-launch inspection stated in the paper was broad enough to take into account a wider diversity of inspection than was apparent from Colonel Florio's remarks. Detailed studies were being undertaken on this subject. In addition, under the U.S. program, this measure was combined with other Stage I measures. In connection with these other measures, the problems of inspection might be somewhat less formidable. Colonel Florio also noted that while we wished to prohibit weapons of mass destruction in space, we might well wish to use space vehicles for destroying ballistic missiles. This should be borne in mind. Mr. Gathright agreed this should be borne in mind but pointed out that Stage I of the U.S. program called for measures affecting weapons designed to counter strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The possibility Colonel Florio had mentioned might arise in this regard as well as in connection with discussion of our outer space proposal.

General Riddel noted they had not yet received comments from London on the paper. However, regarding paragraph III, B1, he believed there might be a question as to whether launch registration with the Secretary General, or the implementation of the no bombs in orbit proposal would get going first. Regarding paragraph III, B 2 did we not believe the elimination of all other weapons of mass destruction from space, including not only nuclear and CBR but others as well, should be sought? He had no additional specific weapons of mass destruction in mind but thought the language of the paper should be broad enough to cover them.

Mr. Wilkinson pointed out that in the past the Soviets had always linked this no bombs in orbit measure with the elimination of military bases. While this was sure to be covered in another paper, shouldn't we note our objection to this linkage here? Mr. Gathright agreed and said, that in presenting our proposal we should link it to measures dealing with other types of delivery systems, not to bases.

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Mr. Beam suggested we next turn to consideration of paper DMP 3/1 on CBR weapons measures. Colonel Fiorio pointed out the general difficulty of verification of CBR limitations. It was clearly a matter on which an Experts Commission such as that proposed in the U.S. program was needed. The widespread nature of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries made it extremely difficult for us to verify with certainty that the manufacture of such weapons would have stopped. Mr. Dainelli agreed, pointing out that the limitation of CBR weapons was clearly not an early measure. Going back to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, he hoped we might at an early stage be able to suggest a similar declaration authorizing the use of CBR weapons. He realized there were US constitutional difficulties regarding this protocol. However, he felt we should make an effort along these lines. Mr. Gathright pointed out that we recognized verification difficulties in this field. It was partly with this in mind that we had suggested that the CBR problem might also be examined from the standpoint of determining possible usefulness of other disarmament measures such as those which might affect the capability of delivering CBR weapons.

General Burns thought that while the Geneva Protocol had not been advised and consented to by the US Senate, in view of the extreme difficulty of developing adequate methods of verification, such a declaration somewhere in Stage 2 might be the only possible way to deal with CBR weapons. In addition, he pointed out we would require, in the future, protection against the development of new and more horrible weapons of mass destruction. Since development of these weapons rests with scientists, and since the weapons have been developed in secrecy, we might consider a proposal for free exchange of scientists and scientific information. The purpose would of course be to stop weapons research and development in the CBR and perhaps other fields.

General Riddel agreed such a proposal might be useful, but believed we would face the old problem of commercial secrecy. General Burns pointed out that in the long run the interests of the world would be better served by the exchange of information on this subject than by the protection of commercial monopolies.

General Riddel said he believed the paper useful and that it might form the basis for the terms of reference for the proposed Experts Commission.

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Mr. Wilkinson cautioned in regard to page 2, section III B that we should not stress too heavily the identification of weapons required for internal order, i.e., tear gas. We should be very careful in presenting this concept to the USSR.

Mr. Beam said if there was no further discussion he would like to next turn to paper DMP 7/1 on military bases.

General Riddel said that the United Kingdom position on the problem of military bases had been guided by three principles. Two of these principles were incorporated in the paper and the third, albeit minor, could be included with a slight wording change. The first principle was that as disarmament progressed in such areas as nuclear delivery vehicles, force levels and conventional armaments, bases would fade away as they no longer served a useful purpose. Secondly, overseas bases would have to be retained to fulfill international obligations as long as those obligations were required. Agreements such as NATO, SEATO and CENTO would probably, under the US plan, disappear at the end of Stage 2 when they were no longer required to maintain the security of the free world. At that point of course the UN Peace Force would replace the security provided by the present regional arrangements. The third point was that at the end of Stage III all states would be left with sufficient forces to provide for internal security. The US bases paper in paragraph III E used the words "national" internal security forces. The United Kingdom foresaw that at the end of Stage 3 they might still be under obligation to provide for internal security in certain overseas locations. In order to square this obligation with the bases paper, he suggested the removal of the word "national" from paragraph III E. This was agreed.

Mr. Dainelli agreed with General Riddel and made a further suggestion that we remove the words "overseas" or "foreign" from our description of military bases. The fact was that many bases in the NATO area were not "foreign" as regards the members of the alliance; that while the base might even have troops from another member of the alliance quartered upon it, the purpose of the base was to defend the security of the whole regional area. Continuing to term these bases as "foreign" serves Soviet ends and invites Soviet attacks on the political integration of our defensive system. They were in fact "foreign" only to the Soviets.

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Ambassador Dean pointed out that the word "foreign" might also give us trouble if present economic associations were extended in the future into the political realm. He emphasized we should recognize wherever we possibly could what changes in the political field might come about over the next 25 years. Recognizing these changes, we should then take them carefully into account in our disarmament plans. Mr. Spiers suggested we edit the military bases paper to take into account these comments.

General Burns added that the bases per se were not important. Troops and equipment made a base important. He agreed with the UK that the principle that when we reduce our arms and troops, military bases will disappear was a good one and one to which we should hold in our position on military bases. He compared a base without troops and equipment to a factory without workmen and machines.

Regarding paragraph III E General Burns believed it out of place to mention the United Nation Peace Force bases at this early stage. He suggested that such bases would have to be considered during the organization of the peace force and that they should be left for discussion in the forthcoming paper on the UN Peace Force. Mr. Gathright suggested we might want to keep in mind the possible needs for the peace force bases as we discuss dismantling or conversion of military bases. General Riddel said that to take into account General Burns' point we might reword the portions of the paper dealing with peace force bases to read "installations (rather than bases) required for the United Nations Peace Force."

Mr. Beam noting the absence of any further comments suggested we turn to what papers might be discussed at future meetings.

Mr. Wilkinson presented copies of two United Kingdom papers -- Peace Keeping and The International Disarmament Organization -- which could be discussed on Thursday. Mr. Beam pointed out the United States might want another day or so to work on its own papers on the IDO and Peacekeeping and suggested postponing the next meeting until Friday. Mr. Spiers pointed out there was also a paper ready on "No-Transfer" (DMP #10) which could also be discussed on Friday.

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Mr. Dainelli asked how long the present series of meetings might continue. Mr. Beam replied that we would probably know by Friday and that he would hope we could be finished as early as Wednesday of next week. Mr. Dainelli hoped that would be the case. He stated certain of the papers were not required to be discussed at the moment and could be considered at some later point or even, if necessary, during the opening meetings of the conference at Geneva.

Mr. Beam set the next meeting for Friday at which time the group would discuss papers on the IDO, Peacekeeping and No Transfer.

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